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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * 
No. 880456-CA 
JUANITA MEYER, aka JUANITA M. 
BODELL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
ARDEN BODELL, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, JUANITA MEYER 
Appeal from the Order of the 
Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County 
State of Utah 
Hon. James S. Sawaya, Judge 
* * * * * * * * 
OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Bodell states that Ms. Meyer's assets increased 
several million dollars during the course of the marriage. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 3. Mr. Bodell fails to state that his 
estate also increased substantially. During the nine year 
marriage, Mr. Bodell acquired several pieces of property, lived 
in Ms. Meyer's home, and was given approximately $58,000 by Ms. 
Meyer to acquire various property. Index Record, p. 3, 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit #2. He also neglects to mention that 
Ms. Meyer's acquisition of property during the marriage was 
primarily from her late husband's estate. 
2. Mr. Bodell is correct in stating that each party 
maintained a separate checking account. Respondent's Brief, p.p. 
3-4. He fails to mention, however, that Ms. Meyer paid most of 
the couple's living expenses. See Appellant's Brief, Exhibit E. 
3. Mr. Bodell next contends that Ms. Meyer alone objected 
to and challenged the 1983 IRS engineering valuation report on 
the University of Utah Mine Property. Respondent's Brief, p. 4. 
Both Mr. Bodell and Ms. Meyer filed objections to the IRS Report 
with Mr. Bodell performing many of the calculations used in the 
Petition filed with United States Tax Court. See Respondent's 
Brief, Exhibit E. Both parties were represented by Dean Chipman. 
4. Mr. Bodell next misrepresents the parties' awareness of 
tax liabilities at the time of divorce on December 6, 1984. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 6. Ms. Meyer and Mr. Bodell were aware 
of possible tax liability at the time of divorce. No actual 
audits to access tax liability, however, were begun until late 
1983 for the tax years 1979, 1980, and 1981,1 and November 7, 
1985 for the tax years 1982 and 1983. Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 
1
 The couple's obligation for tax liabilities for the 
years 1979, 1980, 1981 was settled in a civil action 
initiated by Ms. Meyer in 1986. In June 1985, the IRS 
determined that Ms. Meyer and Mr. Bodell were entitled 
to a $7,881.00 refund plus interest of $7,344.05, See 
Meyer v. Bodell, No. C86-3702 (Third Dist. Ct., Utah) 
(Attached to Respondent's Brief as exhibit "G"). Ms. 
Meyer sought contribution from Mr. Bodell for costs and 
expenses incurred in defending the IRS action. The 
parties settled the suit in October, 1984 when Mr. 
Bodell agreed to give certain property to Ms. Meyer. 
The suit was dismissed with prejudice. 
2 
#4. The actual tax liability for the years 1982 and 1983 was not 
assessed until December, 1986.2 Therefore, Mr. Bodell's 
representation that Ms. Meyer was aware of 1982 and 1983 tax 
obligations at the time of divorce in 1984 is inaccurate. Ms. 
Meyer did not become aware of actual tax obligations until after 
both the decree of divorce was made final and the civil suit 
addressing 1979, 1980, and 1981 taxes was settled. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN OUTSTANDING JOINT TAX OBLIGATION ARISING DURING THE 
COURSE OF A MARRIAGE BUT NOT ASSESSED AGAINST THE PARTIES UNTIL 
SEVERAL YEARS AFTER DIVORCE IS A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY A MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Mr. Bodell contends that joint tax obligations for the years 
1982 and 1983 were known to the parties at the time of the 
2 Ms. Meyer received the 1982 tax deficiency notice on 
December 29, 1986; the 1983 tax deficiency notice was dated 
February 9, 1987. Plaintiff's Trial exhibit #1. Ms. Meyer 
made the 1982 & 1983 audit adjustment payments as follows: 
Date Check# Endorsee Tax Interest Total 
12/29/86 3814 IRS $10,000 $44,845.55 $54,845.55 
12/29/86 3815 ** 8,435.74 3,636.42 12,042.16 
12/31/86 3832 IRS 3,433.48 3,433.48 
01/06/87 3839 IRS 38,344.00 
08/26/87 4079 1,131.95 
04/09/87 432087* IRS $77,753.59 
TOTAL $187,550.73 
*cashier's check **Utah State Tax Commission 
The plaintiff paid a total of $187,550.73, not $423,681.07 
as originally stated in Appellant's Brief, P. 9, Par. 11. 
3 
divorce in 1984. The IRS notice assessing joint tax liability, 
however, was not mailed to the parties until late December 1986, 
over two years after entry of the decree of divorce. The 
Petition filed with the tax court relating to alleged tax 
deficiencies for 1979, 1980, and 1981 has no bearing on 1982 and 
1983 taxes. The first group of tax obligations (1979, 1980, and 
1981) and the subsequent civil suit were the result of a tax 
audit begun in 1983. The subsequent tax obligations (1982 and 
1983), arose out of a second audit initiated in late 1985. 
Although Ms. Meyer may have been aware of possible tax 
liability in 1984, the exact amount of that liability remained 
unknown until late 1986. Indeed, both Ms. Meyer and Mr. Bodell 
questioned the appropriateness of both IRS audits and believed in 
good faith that no additional taxes were owed. Later, however, 
in 1986, the IRS determined that joint tax obligations were owed 
for 1982 and 1983. The IRS and Utah State Tax Notices listed 
both Ms. Meyer and Mr. Bodell as jointly liable. Ms. Meyer paid 
the entire deficiency because the IRS was prepared to sell 
property she owned to satisfy the deficiency. Ms. Meyer later 
requested contribution from Mr. Bodell; Mr. Bodell refused to 
contribute. 
Mr. Bodell correctly states that a modification of a divorce 
decree is appropriate, if the moving party can establish that a 
substantial change of circumstances occurred "which was not 
4 
within the original contemplation of the parties or the court at 
the time the original decree was rendered." Throckmorton v. 
Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah App. 1988); Thompson v. 
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985). A joint tax 
obligation, which accrued during the course of a marriage but 
was not assessed and charged against the parties until several 
years after the marriage terminated, could not be contemplated 
by the parties at the time of divorce. There was nothing to 
contemplate until two years after the divorce when the IRS sent 
its deficiency notice to Ms. Meyer and Mr. Bodell. Indeed Ms. 
Meyer and Mr. Bodell believed that 1982 and 1983 tax liability 
was unwarranted but found out after the divorce was final that 
additional joint tax liability existed. 
POINT II 
RES JUDICATA CANNOT BAR MR. BODELL'S LEGAL OBLIGATION TO PAY 
ONE-HALF OF JOINT OUTSTANDING TAX OBLIGATIONS NOT KNOWN TO THE 
PARTIES AT THE TIME OF DIVORCE AND NOT CONTEMPLATED IN THE 
ORIGINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
The doctrine of res judicata applies in divorce proceedings. 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 123. Its application, 
however, "is unique in divorce actions because of the equitable 
doctrine which allows courts to reopen alimony, support, or 
property distributions if the moving party can demonstrate a 
substantial change of circumstances since the matter was 
previously considered by the court." Id. 767 P.2d at 123 
5 
(emphasis added), see also Thompson, 709 P.2d at 363, 
In the instant case, res judicata is inappropriate to 
relieve Mr. Bodell of his joint tax obligation because a 
substantial change of circumstances (tax deficiencies for years 
1982 and 1983) arose since the entry of the initial decree of 
divorce. In addition, res judicata is only applicable to those 
issues which a party had "a fair opportunity to present and have 
determined in the other proceeding." Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 
123. Ms. Meyer could not have fairly presented and the court 
could not have determined 1982 and 1983 tax obligations because 
the actual amount owed for those years was not known until 1986. 
The res judicata case cited by Mr. Bodell simply states that 
legal recognition of a new category of property rights 
(retirement benefits) after a divorce decree has been entered is 
insufficient to establish a substantial change of circumstances 
to support modification of the original decree. Throckmorton, 767 
P.2d at 124. In the instant case, however, there is no 
retroactive application problem. Mr. Bodell was and continues to 
remain jointly and severally liable for joint tax liabilities 
accrued during his marriage. The tax liability was merely 
determined several years after the marriage ended. There is no 
legal recognition of a new category of property rights. The 1982 
and 1983 tax notices, sent to both Mr. Bodell and Ms. Meyer in 
1986, is a substantial change of circumstances justifying a 
6 
modification of the decree of divorce. The doctrine of res 
judicata simply does not apply to this type of joint marital 
obligation. 
POINT III 
THE ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT EXECUTED PRIOR TO THE PARTIES' 
MARRIAGE DOES NOT PURPORT TO SETTLE JOINT MARITAL OBLIGATIONS 
WHICH AROSE DURING THE COURSE OF THE MARRIAGE 
The Antenuptial Agreement executed on April 16, 1975, prior 
to the marriage between Ms. Meyer and Mr. Bodell, does not 
purport to settle joint marital obligations. Mr. Bodell 
contends in Point III of his brief that the Antenuptial 
Agreement somehow controls joint tax liability which accrued 
during the marriage. The Antenuptial Agreement was merely 
executed to insure that property belonging to each party prior 
to marriage remained his or her separate property after the 
marriage. 
Mr. Bodell submits that the couple's practice of maintaining 
separate accounts read along with the Antenuptial Agreement's 
premarital property arrangements gives rise to an estoppel 
theory making Ms. Meyer solely liable for joint marital taxes. 
Mr. Bodell bases this contention on a presumption that Ms. Meyer 
would have paid the outstanding tax obligations if the couple had 
remained married. This theory is plainly inconsistent with the 
intent and language of the Antenuptial Agreement and the practice 
7 
of the couple during the marriage. 
First, the Antenuptial Agreement simply does not purport to 
settle joint marital debts. Second, Ms. Meyer always expected 
Mr. Bodell to pay a proportionate share of outstanding tax 
obligations. The couple always shared refunds equally, both 
intended to benefit from charitable donations of land, and both 
filed a joint tax return simply because it resulted in a lower 
tax rate for each. Indeed the primary reason for the couple's 
divorce was Mr. Bodell's refusal to pay his fair share of joint 
marital obligations. Furthermore, Ms. Meyer paid the full amount 
of the 1982 and 1983 deficiencies because the IRS threatened to 
put a lien on her property and bank accounts. She has repeatedly 
sought contribution from Mr. Bodell and always expected him to 
share jointly in any outstanding liability. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, it was improper for the trial court to deny Ms. 
Meyer's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce. A joint 
tax obligation, which arose during the course of a marriage, but 
was not assessed against the parties until two years after the 
divorce would appear to be the kind of substantial change of 
circumstances contemplated by the Supreme Court in Thompson. 
Similarly, res judicata cannot apply in divorce proceedings where 
8 
the moving party sufficiently demonstrates that the issue in 
question constitutes a substantial change of circumstances. 
Finally, the Antenuptial Agreement does not purport to settle 
joint marital debts. Instead, Mr. Bodell was fully expected to 
contribute his fair share and remains jointly and severally 
liable by the operation of section 6013(d) of the Internal 
Revenue Service Code. 
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